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The evolution of language required elaboration of a number of independent mechanisms in
the hominin lineage, including systems involved in signaling, semantics, and syntax. Two
perspectives on the evolution of syntax can be contrasted. The “continuist” perspective
seeks the evolutionary roots of complex human syntax in simpler combinatory systems
used in animal communication systems, such as iteration and sequencing. The “exapta-
tionist” perspective posits evolutionary change of function, so that systems today used for
linguistic communication might previously have served quite different functions in earlier
hominids. I argue that abundant biological evidence supports an exaptationist perspec-
tive, in general, and that it must be taken seriously when considering language evolution.
When applied to syntax, this suggests that core computational components used today
in language could have originally served non-linguistic functions such as motor control,
non-verbal thought, or spatial reasoning. I outline three speciﬁc exaptationist hypotheses
for spoken language.These three hypotheses each posit a change of functionality in a pre-
cursor circuit, and its transformation into a neural circuit or region speciﬁcally involved in
language today. Hypothesis 1 suggests that the precursor mechanism for intentional vocal
control, speciﬁcally direct cortical control over the larynx, was manual motor control sub-
served by the cortico-spinal tract. The second is that the arcuate fasciculus, which today
connects syntactic and lexical regions, had its origin in intracortical connections subserving
vocal imitation.The third is that the specialized components of Broca’s area, speciﬁcally BA
45, had their origins in non-linguistic motor control, and speciﬁcally hierarchical planning of
action. I conclude by illustrating the importance of both homology (studied via primates)
and convergence (typically analyzed in birds) for testing such evolutionary hypotheses.
Keywords: syntax, cognitive biology, evolution of language, comparative neuroscience, arcuate fasciculus, vocal
imitation, human evolution, Broca’s area
INTRODUCTION
NATURALIZING THE LINGUISTIC BRAIN
Human language, in its mature state, is a complex system that
allows us to encode and communicate thoughts and experiences
via hierarchically structured signals called sentences. Humans,
apparently uniquely among living animals, are born with a capac-
ity to acquire such systems readily andwithout the need for explicit
tutelage: an instinct to learn language. The capacity for syntax is a
central component of this system.
The traditional textbook picture of the neural circuitry under-
lying the human capacity for language involves premotor speech
and syntax areas in Broca’s region, posterior temporo-parietal
areas involved in comprehension, and connections between them
involving the arcuate fasciculus.Current opinions about this three-
component model vary from tacit acceptance in many studies to
ﬂat-out rejection by a few (e.g., Lieberman, 2000). Today, it seems
clear from modern brain imaging work that parts of this model
were right all along (e.g., that Broca’s area, especially Brodmann’s
Area (BA) 44 and BA 45, play an important role in language).
Other parts are only partially correct (e.g., brain regions involved
in language, especially production, tend to be biased toward the left
hemisphere, but earlier scientists erred in seeing this bias as a com-
plete left localization). The “connectionist” (in the Lichtheimian
nineteenth century sense, not the twentieth century neural net-
work sense) component of the model has had new life breathed
into it by comparative diffusion-tensor imaging (DTI) research
(Catani and Mesulam, 2008; Rilling et al., 2008). While the impor-
tance of left-lateralization, or the precision with which“Wernicke’s
area” can be localized, may be questioned, the basic notion that
Broca’s area and its connections with parietal and temporal cortex
play an important role in language, both in speech and in syntax,
seems rather clear. In this article I will take this for granted, and
inquire into the evolution of these linguistic circuits.
When we inquire into the evolutionary changes characterizing
human language, our most solid point of reference will always be
differences between human brains and brains of other primates,
whether in brain anatomy or in brain function. That is, in evolu-
tionary terms,we are seeking human autapomorphies (traits which
differentiate us from our closest relatives, and were not present in
the last shared ancestor). Cladistically speaking, the correct com-
parisons are with our nearest living cousins, the great apes, though
both technical and ethical problems with ape neuroscience often
force us to rely heavily on more distant primate cousins, especially
macaques, to identify evaluate human specializations. So, given
the evident absence of language in apes, the fundamental question
is “what derived features underlying language arose in the human
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lineage after it separated from our last common ancestor (LCA)
with chimpanzees?” This search for differences, for derived traits,
is thus a search for human autapomorphies.
However, in asking this question about human specializations
we obviously should not ignore the vast amount of neurobiology
thatwe sharewith other primates, or other vertebratesmore gener-
ally. Modern neuroscience is full of neural synapomorphies (traits
we share with relatives, by common descent). With other verte-
brates we share virtually all aspects of neurotransmitter chemistry,
neuronal morphology, and brainstem circuitry, along with many
detailed aspects of neural processing (e.g., the circuitry of the
retina or superior colliculus, or the layout of motor circuitry in
the cerebellum or basal ganglia). With other mammals we share
the possession of a six-layered neocortex and the strongly con-
served pattern of connectivity between its layers. When it comes
to chimpanzees, it is no exaggeration to say that virtually all known
aspects of neuroanatomy appear to be shared, aside from gross size
differences, and there are actually few known differences between
apes and otherOldWorld primates (for an exception seeNimchin-
sky et al., 1999). So whatever the neural differences underlying the
human capacity for language are, theymust always be viewed in the
context of an ocean of similarity. Human neural autapomorphies
are needles in a synapomorphic haystack.
From a biologist’s viewpoint, there is of course nothing special
about being “special.” Every living species possesses autapomor-
phies of some sort (otherwise it would not be recognizable as a
species), and these specialities always are understood in the con-
text of a much larger set of synapomorphies. We should be no
more surprised by human neural autapomorphies tied to language
than we are to ﬁnd that star-nosed moles have a highly specialized
somatosensory cortex for their nasal “ﬁngers” (Catania, 1999), or
that echolocating bats have specialized auditory regions for their
echolocation calls (Suga et al., 1987). It is thus unfortunate that
when considering our own specializations, humans have a ten-
dency to invest them with especial signiﬁcance. This is a mistake.
Biologists and neuroscientists should not allow our investigation
of neural autapomorphies to be conﬂated with philosophers’ long-
running search for deﬁning features of humanity, features that,
as a modern replacement to the uniquely human soul, might be
misused to justify moral or ethical stances. An ethics built upon
empirically determined autapomorphies is built upon shifting
sands, as scientiﬁc ﬁndings might demand change at any point.
Thus it is important to divest our investigations of any neural
differences that exist from larger, and essentially philosophical,
questions about why humans are “special” in ethical or moral
senses.
Our task, as neurobiologists, is simply to identify the various
neural mechanisms underlying language and, using the compara-
tive approach, to determine which are synapomorphic and which
are not. And, given that language relies on widely shared neural
foundations,we should not be surprised to ﬁnd abundant synapo-
morphies, nor shouldwe take such ﬁndings as evidence against the
existence of autapomorphies.My goal in this paper is to explore the
evolution of human neural autapomorphies involved in language,
with a focus on syntax.This explorationwill adopt a fully compara-
tive approach, using what is known from research on non-human
primates, mammals more generally, and birds, to contextualize
whatever few autapomorphies humans possess in terms of the
much wider foundation of shared synapomorphies.
Furthermore, I will attempt to clarify and defend one particular
approach to the evolution of novelties, based on the idea of exap-
tation: that complex structures, evolved in one functional context,
can change their function, and be put to work in new domains,
often carrying with them traces or constraints due to their prior
function. This exaptationist perspective is in full accordance with
the truism that evolution has no foresight, or with the evoca-
tive image of evolution as a “tinkerer,” that gets by with whatever
parts or raw materials happen to be available (Jacob, 1977, 1982).
Nonetheless, the notion of exaptation when applied to human
cognitive evolution has evoked skepticism or even hostility (e.g.,
Dennett, 1995; Buss et al., 1998; Newmeyer, 1998; Pinker and Jack-
endoff, 2005), even by those who accept the more general notion
of evolution as tinkerer. Thus I will start with a brief exploration
of the general concept of change of function (which was a corner-
stone of Darwin’s model of evolution) and its resurrection in the
term “exaptation” by Gould and Vrba, and then very brieﬂy out-
line some of the objections that have been made to this concept,
and the closely related concept of “spandrels,” as applied to human
cognition and language.
Next, I will outline in detail three exaptive hypothesis concern-
ing human language, which illustrate how an explicitly exaptive
model, built on a ﬁrm comparative foundation, can both make
sense of human specializations and provide further testable pre-
dictions for neuroscientists “on the front line” of comparative and
functional neuroscience. These hypotheses are, for the most part,
built upon the ideas of other scholars, though they are not always
framed in the context of exaptation. Although I ﬁnd each of these
hypotheses plausible, my goal here is not to convince anyone that
they are true. Rather, my purpose is to demonstrate that exap-
tive hypotheses about language evolution are plausible, and are
part and parcel of a standard biological approach. Further, I detail
some testable predictions in the hope that some future neuro-
scientists will attempt to test such models. In the ﬁnal part of
the paper, I will brieﬂy describe the virtues of a broad compar-
ative approach, incorporating research on both mammals and
primates (to discern homologies and ancestral states) and birds
(to exploit the hypothesis-testing power of convergent evolution).
I believe that there is real value to be gained for evolutionary
neuroscience in adopting the rigorous and explicit comparative
approach that evolutionary biologists have perfected in the last
few decades (complete with the admittedly somewhat ungainly
terminology of synapomorphies and autapomorphies).
Naturalizing the human brain demands that we acknowledge
both its widely shared foundations with other animals, and recog-
nize at the same time its unique specializations.Ourunderstanding
of ourselves will be incomplete without a clear-eyed acceptance of
both classes of traits. My goal in this paper will be to investigate
how autapomorphies characteristic of our species, and speciﬁ-
cally involved in language, might have evolved. More speciﬁcally,
I aim to defend the proposition that change in function, one of
Darwin’s favorite evolutionary phenomena, might have played an
important role in language evolution and particularly for syntax.
From this“exaptationist”perspective, Iwill arguewithmanyothers
that precursors for some language functions will be found not in
Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 3 | Article 9 | 2
Fitch Exaptation and the evolution of syntax
primate communication, but in other aspects of behavior such as
motor control or thought. This is by no means a new suggestion,
but I will attempt to clarify this exaptive perspective by offering
three quite speciﬁc models of possible exaptive phenomena,where
a circuit built for one function is put to use in another, that are
tied to human language.
EXAPTATION AND CHANGE OF FUNCTION
Darwinwas famously a gradualist, suggesting that his entire theory
would fall apart if one example of evolutionary leaps, or saltations,
could be shown. Gradualism, at its simplest, is the assumption that
the distribution of phenotypes across evolutionary time is smooth
and continuous (like bodymass or height) rather than discrete and
discontinuous (like eye or ﬂower color). This is a commitment to
a continuum of phenotypes. Darwin’s gradualist perspective was
weakened considerably in the modern evolutionary synthesis of
genetics and evolutionary theory, initially by the fact that genes
are, by their nature, discrete. More recently, the assumption of a
smooth relation between genotypic and phenotypic change has
been challenged by the discovery of homeotic “master control
genes” like HOX or PAX genes in which small genetic changes
have drastic phenotypic effects. Nonetheless, a smooth contin-
uum of phenotypes appears to be common in many traits, and
such smoothness is assumed to be operative by many models of
selection (e.g., the Price equation). So gradualism survives, but in
a weaker form than Darwin considered to necessary.
A different kind of potential“smoothness” in evolution involves
continuity of function. In this case, Darwin was a discontinuist,
for he gave multiple examples of “changes in function,” and he
saw these as exemplifying a major driving force in the evolution
of complexity. For example, in discussing the evolution of verte-
brate lungs, Darwin proposed that these structures ﬁrst evolved as
complex swim bladders involved in buoyancy control in ancestral
ﬁsh. As our aquatic ancestors became air breathers, the func-
tion of these ancestral swim bladders was converted to that of
lungs, which function in the respiratory exchange of gases. Dar-
win cited several other examples of change in function, including
the separate use of the swim-bladder in hearing in some ﬁsh, and
from ﬂowers and barnacles. Although Darwin gave no speciﬁc
term to “nascent” traits in which function changed, later authors
termed the precursor versions “pre-adaptations.” More recently
(Gould and Vrba, 1982) objected to the term “pre-adaptation”
because of its teleological connotations of evolutionary foresight,
and coined the term“exaptation” for the end-product of an evolu-
tionary change in function. Gould and Vrba argued convincingly
that such changes in function are ubiquitous in evolution, somuch
that most complex traits have gone through at least one change in
function.
Darwin recognized the exaptive process of evolutionary change
of function, combined with gradualism, as a crucial factor in the
evolution of complex organs for a simple reason: it is often difﬁcult
to see how a small rudiment of an organ could have any adap-
tive function until it exceeded a certain size or complexity. What
good is a tiny lung, that could only fulﬁll a small proportion of
the individual’s respiratory needs? What good is a tiny wing, that
could never allow an organism to become airborne (Kingsolver
and Koehl, 1985)? By the assumption of continuity of function,
these are big problems. But as soon as we consider the possibility
of change of function, the answer becomes obvious: lungs started
out as swim bladders (where a little buoyancy might still be use-
ful) and wings as temperature regulators (where a small radiating
or insulating surface might make a considerable contribution).
For further examples of change of function (see Gould and Vrba,
1982), and for a critique and clariﬁcation of some of the con-
ceptual issues this raises (see Reeve and Sherman, 1993; Dennett,
1995). It should be noted that it appears that Darwin was incorrect
in his swim-bladder example about the direction of change. It now
appears that lungs evolved ﬁrst (in early ﬁsh, who also possessed
gills) and were later converted to complex swim bladders in later
ﬁsh radiations [see Fitch (2010) for this and other examples of
exaptations related to speech].
EXAPTATION IN COGNITIVE EVOLUTION
Given the established fact that organs can change their function,
and the importance of this fact for evolutionary theory, it is some-
what surprising that exaptation has been dismissed (or worse,
ignored) by many researchers interested in human cognitive evo-
lution (cf. Gould, 1991; Buss et al., 1998). This is particularly true
in language evolution,where a continuity of a function in commu-
nication is assumed by many (e.g., Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Pinker
and Jackendoff, 2005) while changes in function are seen by others
as an explanatory necessity (e.g., Berwick, 1997; Chomsky, 2010).
Part of this debate can be readily resolved by adopting a
multi-component perspective, wherein human language capa-
bilities enlist several interacting but independent mechanisms.
Many of these mechanisms will be shared with other animals,
but several appear to have changed considerably since the LCA
of humans and chimpanzees (hereafter, the LCA), including those
involved in signaling, syntax, and semantics (cf. Fitch, 2010). From
a multi-component perspective it is perfectly plausible that some
novel aspects of language (e.g., speech production or hearing) are
fully continuous in function from the LCA, whereas others may
constitute exaptations where function has changed. Prominent
candidates for exaptive change are the computational mecha-
nisms subserving linguistic syntax, the topic of the current article.
But to illustrate the point I will start with a less controversial
and better understood example, drawn from the neural circuitry
underlying language. First it is necessary to clarify how a multi-
component perspective on contemporary language circuits leads
to implications for a multi-stage model of language evolution.
EXAPTATION AND DIFFERING MODELS OF PROTOLANGUAGE
A logical concomitant of a multi-component perspective on lan-
guage evolution is a notion of intermediate stages during human
evolution in which certain components of language were present,
while others were either lacking entirely or not integrated into a
linguistic system. For those novel aspects of language that evolved
since the LCA, the term “protolanguage” is often used to denote
such a precursor system, an evolutionary way-station on the path
to full modern language. The term “protolanguage” was ﬁrst
used in an evolutionary context by anthropologist Gordon Hewes
(1973), who introduced it in the context of a gestural protolan-
guage hypothesis, by which early stages of linguistic signaling were
in themanual/visual domain. Itwas further popularizedby linguist
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Derek Bickerton, who used the term to denote a lexical model of
protolanguage, in which spoken words formed the ﬁrst stage of
language evolution (Bickerton, 1990, 2000, 2007). One of the old-
est models of protolanguage dates back to Darwin (1871), who
suggested that the earliest stages of human language were musical,
with no semantic content. This notion of “musical protolanguage”
or “prosodic protolanguage” has more recently been embraced by
a number of scholars (Richman, 1993; Brown, 2000; Mithen, 2005;
Fitch, 2006). For more detail on these and other conceptions of
protolanguage (see Fitch, 2010).
Different models of protolanguage constitute different
hypotheses about the nature of the mechanisms involved in mod-
ern language, along with an implied order in which these mecha-
nismswere acquired during human evolution.Often, thesemodels
also offer, whether explicitly or implicitly, hypotheses about the
function(s) subserved by different mechanisms as well. For exam-
ple, Bickerton (2010) suggests that the ﬁrst words served the
communicative function of displaced reference (allowing early
hominins to communicate about distant food sources), and that
this putative function has remained continuous since that time.
In contrast, Darwin’s model suggests that the initial function of
complex, learned signals was courtship and territorial defense, in
direct analogy to birdsong.Darwin’smusical protolanguagemodel
thus entails a change of function, fromnon-verbal communication
to semantic communication of propositional knowledge, during
hominin evolution. Bickerton’s model is thus continuist in this
respect, while Darwin’s is exaptive, involving a change in function.
Peter MacNeilage, a speech scientist, has offered an exaptive
hypothesis for the evolution of speech, where the oscillatory
lip, jaw, and tongue movements involved in producing conso-
nant/vowel alternations in human speech we co-opted from the
basic mammalian circuitry controlling chewing, licking, and suck-
ling (MacNeilage, 1998). Like Darwin’s swim bladder example,
MacNeilage’s hypothesis suggests that the complex and coordi-
nated motor activities used in speech were taken over from the
already complex and coordinated motor control that had evolved,
over tens of millions of years, in ancestral mammals to subserve
feeding. In the commentary following this article,many critics sug-
gested that a continuity of function was more likely (and thus that
human speech evolved from primate vocalizations), but none of
them questioned the general plausibility of MacNeilage’s exaptive
explanation.
Another prominent exaptive model for language evolution is
due to Noam Chomsky (1968, 1976, 2010), who argued that the
roots of the generative capacity of language should be sought
in private conceptual abilities, rather than in communication of
knowledge between individuals. His argument, echoed by various
prominent biologists like Jacques Monod and Salvador Luria, is
that language is far more powerful than it needs to be for com-
munication. Thus, the vast reach of language into all aspects of
human cognition cannot be explained by a step-by-step expan-
sion of communication abilities, because most of the sentences we
can generate and understand would have no conceivable selective
advantage (cf. Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994; Berwick, 1997). In con-
trast, a ﬂexible and extendable system of thought would always
be of considerable adaptive value, because even small advan-
tages in thought can prove valuable if they allow an individual
to out-think conspeciﬁcs (cf. Jolly, 1966; Humphrey, 1976; Byrne,
1997). In other words, language appears to be more powerful than
needed for everyday communication but appropriately powerful
as a medium for creative, generative thought. Again, this is simply
an exaptive hypothesis like many others, where the function of
one aspect of language has changed, over evolutionary time, from
conceptual to communicative, but this particular exaptive hypoth-
esis has been singled out for criticism by many authors (Pinker
and Bloom, 1990; Newmeyer, 1998; Jackendoff and Pinker, 2005;
Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005), so much so that linguist Freder-
ick Newmeyer confessed to ﬁnding Chomsky’s ideas on this front
“utterly implausible” (Newmeyer, 1998).
As this brief review illustrates, there is considerable disagree-
ment about the importance of exaptive change in function in the
evolution of human language, and opinions are particularly polar-
ized in the domain of syntax. Of course, one’s model of language
evolution depends on one’s conception of contemporary language,
and some real disagreements stem from such underlying theo-
retical biases. On the other hand, the many examples of change
of function in other evolutionary domains force us to consider
exaptive hypotheses concerning language with an open mind. The
conversion between swimbladders and lungs,or between radiators
and insect wings, may not appear intuitively plausible, but both
are taken very seriously by contemporary evolutionary biologists.
Furthermore, when continuity of function is simply assumed
without argument, this assumption may conceal further problem-
atic assumptions. For example, Clark (2011) shows how Bicker-
ton’smodel of language evolution, based on continuity of commu-
nicative function,makes several problematic implicit assumptions
that Bickerton himself fails to consider. Furthermore, the assump-
tion of functional continuity may block consideration of alterna-
tive hypotheses. For example, it was assumed for many years that
the only plausible explanation for the descent of the human lar-
ynxwas for speech communication (Lieberman,1968,1975,1984).
This led researchers to overlook examples of laryngeal descent in
multiple animal species (e.g., Fitch and Reby, 2001; Weissengru-
ber et al., 2002; Frey and Riede, 2003), all of which lack speech,
and which clearly demonstrate that a descended larynx can serve
adaptive functions other than spoken language (see below for the
importance of convergent evolution in such inferences).
Thus, rather than formulating the problem of language evo-
lution as the transition from non-human primates to modern
human language, in all its glory, we should rather investigate
models in which several stages of protolanguage existed. It is less
important to know when these different stages occurred (e.g., in
Australopithecus or Homo erectus) than it is to construct plau-
sible scenarios in which speciﬁc novel abilities evolved, building
on pre-existing mechanisms but extending them in the required
direction. For example,weknow that humans evolvednovel speech
control mechanisms, so one stage in human evolution must cer-
tainly have involved this capacity. However, many organisms have
vocal imitation but lack language, so we must further posit addi-
tional evolutionary events in which syntactic or semantic abilities
evolved. It is of course possible that multiple capacities evolved
simultaneously, but to me it seems much more likely that each of
these capacities evolved at different times, involved different cir-
cuits, and possibly served different adaptive functions. It is equally
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possible that some of these stages were exaptive (building on non-
communicative precursors) while others were characterized by
continuity of function.
THREE EXAPTIVE HYPOTHESES IN THE EVOLUTION OF
LANGUAGE
In the rest of this article I will consider the evolution of the var-
ious mechanisms underlying modern linguistic abilities, taking
seriously the possibility of one or more changes in function.
EXAPTIVE HYPOTHESIS 1: SPEECH MOTOR CONTROL AND DIRECT
CORTICO-AMBIGUAL CONNECTIONS
While humans are gifted vocal imitators, picking up words and
melodies in their environment spontaneously, other primates are
not: a chimpanzee raised in a human home will never learn to
speak or sing (Yerkes and Yerkes, 1929; Hayes, 1951). This is not
due to their peripheral vocal anatomy:mostmammals can dynam-
ically lower their larynx to a position that would allow different
vowels to be produced (Fitch, 2002, 2010). Furthermore, vocal
tract deﬁciencies would not account for the failure of chimpanzees
to imitate melodies, which would require only laryngeal control.
Thus, the biological explanation of the lack of complex vocal learn-
ing in non-human primates must have something to do with brain
structure.
A prominent hypothesis for what, precisely, accounts for the
difference between humans and other primates was developed by
Uwe Jürgens and his colleagues, on the basis of initial observations
by the comparative neuroanatomist Hans Kuypers, and I thus call
it the “Kuypers/Jürgens direct connections hypothesis” (Kuypers,
1958a,b, 1973; Jürgens et al., 1982). Kuypers explored the con-
nections from motor cortex to subcortical motor systems in the
brainstem and spinal cord, and compared these between cats, non-
human primates (chimpanzees and macaques), and humans. He
used Nauta/Gygax staining to document axonal degeneration after
lesions (in animals) or strokes (in humans) to the motor cortex.
He examined in particular the motor neurons controlling laryn-
geal muscles, located in the nucleus ambiguus of the medulla. He
found that there were projections from cortical motor neurons
directly onto these motor neurons only in humans. In cats or non-
human primates, only multi-synaptic indirect connections were
present to ambigual motor neurons. Interestingly, Kuypers found
that chimpanzees and macaques do have direct connections to
brainstem nuclei controlling the face (lips and jaw), while cats lack
these.
This argument is consistent with lesion data: while lesions to
motor cortex can induce long-lasting mutism in humans,matched
lesions have no effect upon vocal production in monkeys (Sutton
et al., 1974; Aitken, 1981; Jürgens et al., 1982). Lesions to lat-
eral cortex often severely disrupt human speech, but spare innate
species-typical vocalizations like laughter and crying (Foerster,
1936; Groswasser et al., 1988). Finally, since non-human primates
have direct cortico-motor connections to the jaws, tongue,and lips,
the frequent use by chimpanzees of learned, un-phonated “vocal-
izations” like jaw clacks, lip smacks, and lip buzzes (“raspberries”)
in volitional, goal-directed communication (Marshall et al., 1999;
Reynolds Losin et al., 2008) is consistent with the general idea that
direct connections are needed for learned, volitional communica-
tion. All that is missing in chimpanzees is laryngeal control. These
data, and other convergent data from birds (see below), has led
many comparative neuroscientists to endorse the idea that direct
cortico-motor connections to the larynx play a key role in human
speech abilities (e.g., Myers, 1976; Deacon, 1992; Holstege and
Ehling, 1996; Striedter, 2004).
How did humans develop direct connections that are lacking
in other primates? In this case we have a very clear candidate
for a mammalian “pre-adaptation” for this human situation: the
cortico-spinal tract. The cortico-spinal tract is a major descending
pathway from motor cortex down to motor neurons within the
spinal cord. Cortico-spinal axons originate in pyramidal neurons
in layer V of the neocortex, mostly in primary motor cortex but
also from premotor cortex, the supplementary motor area (SMA),
cingulate gyrus, and somatosensory cortex. A clear homolog of
the cortico-spinal tract is present in all mammals. A closely related
set of cortico-motor projections make up the cortico-bulbar tract,
whichproject fromcortex down to various brainstemmotor nuclei
found in the trigeminal (CNV, controlling the jaw), facial (CNVII:
lips and other facial musculature), and hypoglossal (CN XII, con-
trolling the tongue) nuclei. Thus, in primates, the cortico-bulbar
and cortico-spinal tracts together innervate motor neurons above
and below the key laryngeal motor neurons located in the nucleus
ambiguus (CNX, containing themotor neurons of the vagus nerve
complex, including the superior and recurrent laryngeal nerves).
I suggest that either, or both, of these tracts provided a precur-
sor of the direct cortico-ambigual connections found in humans.
Speciﬁcally, I propose that the developmental processes underlying
axonal growth and synapse-formation in the cortico-spinal tract
were“exapted” to generate cortico-ambigual connections found in
adult humans and which play a key role in speech.
Why do such direct connections develop in humans but not
other primates? An intriguing hypothesis has been put forward
by Terrence Deacon, involving competition between an innate call
systembased in the brainstem,and the cortico-motor system.Most
mammals share a basic system for producing species-typical calls,
involving a “control center” in the periaqueductal gray (PAG) of
the midbrain (Jürgens, 1994; Holstege and Ehling, 1996). This
system can produce the entire species-typical vocal repertoire of
cats or squirrel monkeys, or innate vocalizations like laughter and
crying in humans, and does not rely upon cortical input (hence,
anencephalic human babies who lack a neocortex can still smile,
laugh, and cry normally). Deacon has suggested that, during devel-
opment, there is competition between this prepotent brainstem
system and cortical axons projecting down through the brain-
stem, which transiently connect to laryngeal motor neurons in
the nucleus ambiguus, but are out-competed by the innate vocal
system projections from PAG and other centers (Deacon, 1992,
1997). By Deacon’s hypothesis, evolving the kind of direct corti-
cal control over vocalizations typical of humans would require a
reduction in the innate call system, and perhaps also the innate
call repertoire. This hypothesis has various testable predictions,
and even suggests that direct cortico-motor connections could be
elicited experimentally in other mammals, if the innate call system
was reduced by lesions at the right stage of development (along
the lines of Roe et al., 1992).
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Obviously, speech motor control is closely tied to the audi-
tory/vocal modality of communication, and speech is not syn-
onymous with, or even necessary for, human language. How-
ever, this aspect of speech does provide a simple, clear example
of how a particular neural circuit involved in spoken language
might have evolved via exaptation of a pre-existing motor circuit
found in other primates. While the Kuypers/Jürgens hypothesis
is the best available explanation of human vocal control capac-
ities at present, the exaptive hypothesis sketched above remains
speculative at present. However, it is clearly both testable, and con-
sistent with a considerable body of knowledge from comparative
neuroscience.
EXAPTIVE HYPOTHESIS 2: INTRACORTICAL CONNECTIONS INVOLVED
IN SPEECH
While the previous example focused on speech motor output,
another well-known example of an important circuit involved
in spoken language is provided by the arcuate fasciculus con-
necting temporal/parietal regions to motor and premotor cortex.
This white-matter ﬁber tract was originally discussed in Wer-
nicke’s analysis of “conduction aphasia” (Wernicke, 1874), but its
importance was highlighted in some classic papers by Norman
Geschwind (1965, 1970). Wernicke’s original argument concerned
the necessity, in speech, of an exchange of information between
auditory areas which store the sound of a word and motor areas
which mediate the motor outputs capable of generating that
sound with the articulators. This idea was (over)extended by
Lichtheim and Geschwind to include a third hypothetical asso-
ciation area in the angular gyrus. But Wernicke’s basic notion
that the ability to learn to vocally produce heard sounds (such
as words or melodies) requires connections between auditory and
motor centers is sound, and has withstood the test of time. For
a detailed history of this discussion (see Catani and Mesulam,
2008).
The advent of DTI and in vivo tractography has breathed con-
siderable new life into these old ideas, documenting differences
between human brains and those of other primates (Rilling et al.,
2008). As in the previous example, there appear to be signiﬁcant
differences among species in the intracortical white-matter con-
nections between temporal, parietal, and frontal regions that are
plausibly related to speech motor control (see Petkov and Jarvis,
this issue). In particular, Rilling and colleagues found that while
the macaque homolog of the arcuate fasciculus makes only spe-
ciﬁc and limited connections between the superior temporal gyrus
and regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex, the human arcuate
makes rich and extensive connections to the middle and inferior
temporal gyri as well. This expansion of the connectivity from
prefrontal regions to essentially the entire temporal lobe may be
linked to a relative expansion in humans of both frontal (Deacon,
1997; Schoenemann et al., 2005) and temporal regions (Rilling
and Seligman, 2002). This expanded connectivity was also found,
but to a limited degree, in one of the four chimpanzee brains
scanned.
The expansion and elaboration of the arcuate fasciculus in
humans has a more interesting implication in the context of the
current topic of exaptation, because many have noted that this
pathway is involved not only in speech imitation but also in some
aspects of syntax processing. Although Broca himself viewed his
eponymous area as primarily involved in speech output, it has
become abundantly clear that premotor areas such as BA 44 are
also involved in auditory comprehension, and syntax processing
in particular (e.g., Caramazza and Zurif, 1976; Grossman, 1980;
Friederici et al., 2000). Because this issue is more thoroughly
reviewed elsewhere in this issue, I will not go into the details
here.
My main point is to suggest that these two functions – audi-
tory/motor exchange and syntax production and comprehen-
sion – are not unrelated. Speciﬁcally, I hypothesize that reciprocal
auditory/motor connections that initially evolved in the context
of vocal imitation (an output function) could later be exapted
for use in syntax comprehension (an input function). The logic
underlying this suggestion is similar to that underlying the motor
theory of speech production (Liberman et al., 1967; Liberman
and Mattingly, 1985; Galantucci et al., 2006; Feenders et al., 2008;
Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010) or more recent ideas about the
role of the mirror neuron system in linking motor action and
visual perception in the support of social cognition or empathy
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Arbib, 2005; Iacoboni et al., 2005; Key-
sers and Gazzola, 2006). The prefrontal component of this system
is, at birth, concerned basically with motor control. It develops,
through babbling and later practice with speech production, a
quite complex repertoire of automatized vocal actions. This ini-
tially occurs with auditory guidance, but has little signiﬁcance for
auditory comprehension itself. However, once such a learned cor-
tical repertoire exists, it could provide a useful, highly articulated
basis for auditory phonetic comprehension (knowing what a sound
is based on the actions that would be needed to produce it) and,
at a higher level, syntactic, or semantic (knowing what a sentence
means based on the structures that would be needed to generate
that meaning).
As phrased above, this hypothesis could apply either to
ontogeny (during individual brain development) or phylogeny
(during the evolutionof the requiredneural circuits in the species).
However, one reason to doubt a purely ontogenetic interpretation
of syntactic circuitry is provided by studies of signed language
(Bellugi et al., 1990). Although the output modality of sign is
obviously different from that of speech (involving mostly limb
movements, and monitored via vision and somatosensory sys-
tems), the syntactic processing of sign nonetheless relies on a brain
region identical to, or at least greatly overlapping, Broca’s area
in spoken language (Horwitz et al., 2003). This suggests that the
appropriate connections develop reliably in all humans, regardless
of linguistic modality, and thus suggests an inﬂuence of an evolved
pattern of connectivity in addition to the role of cortical plasticity
during individual development.
Exaptive hypothesis 2 thus suggests that the intracortical con-
nections of the human arcuate fasciculus initially evolved for
the speciﬁc purpose of vocal imitation. These connections, once
in place, were then again exapted for use in the more complex
task of syntactic comprehension, and particularly between pre-
motor control regions and posterior regions involved in semantic
interpretation. This exaptation would have constituted a second
evolutionary event, occurring afterward and perhaps for different
selective reasons from the ﬁrst.
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EXAPTIVE HYPOTHESIS 3: THE EVOLUTION OF BROCA’S AREA
(BA 44 AND 45)
The third exaptive hypothesis considered here is closely related
to the previous one, and concerns the evolution of speciﬁc cor-
tical regions involved in syntax. While the previous hypothesis is
hodological, concerned with connections, this one is cytoarchi-
tectonic, and concerned with the computational specializations of
speciﬁc cortical regions. This hypothesis builds largely upon the
work of Angela Friederici andher colleagues (Friederici et al., 2006;
Anwander et al., 2007; Bahlmann et al., 2008). It is widely recog-
nized that the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG), the traditional site
of “Broca’s area,” is subdivided into multiple regions distinguish-
able on the basis of cytoarchitecture, receptor distributions, and
connectivity (Amunts et al., 1999; Zilles, 2004). Four core regions
can be distinguished, the ﬁrst three designated by their BA:
1. The inferior portion BA 6 – premotor and supplementary
cortex;
2. BA 44 – “pars opercularis” – just anterior to BA6;
3. BA 45 – “pars triangularis” – anterior to BA 44;
4. “Deep frontal operculum”– inferior toBA44,and curlingunder
the temporal lobe.
BA 44 and 45 are the core of Broca’s area, as classically deﬁned.
In an important study, Horwitz et al. (2003) investigated brain
activation during signing and speech by ﬂuent bilinguals, and
then correlated the brain activation patterns with cytoarchitec-
tonic maps. They found that BA 44 was activated not only during
speech or sign production, but also during complex, volitional
movements of the limbs or vocal apparatus with no linguistic
content. In contrast, BA 45 was activated only during the produc-
tion of either spoken or signed language (complex narratives, so
including phonological, syntactic, and semantic components). In
both cases, activations were signiﬁcantly above baseline only in the
left hemisphere. These data suggest that Broca’s region is parcel-
lated into regions that differ in the degree to which they are tied
to motor control.
The idea that Broca’s area is made up of computationally
distinct regions receives strong support from neuroanatomical
research on both humans and monkeys (Rempel-Clower and
Barbas, 2000; Anwander et al., 2007; Gerbella et al., 2010). Cytoar-
chitectonically, each of the four regions above is distinct in terms of
the granularity of layer 4 of neocortex. BA 45 has a well-developed
granular layer 4 (it is“granular”),while layer 4 is present but poorly
developed inBA44 (which is thus termed“dysgranular”). Thedeep
frontal operculum and BA 6 are “agranular”: they lack any distinct
layer 4 (a trait typical of motor regions).
Connectivity also varies among these regions. Tracer studies
in macaques, which remain the “gold standard” for analysis of
connectivity, clearly show that differences in granularity reﬂect
fundamental differences in connectivity (Rempel-Clower and Bar-
bas, 2000), and such studies also show that BA 45 in macaques
clearly divides into two distinct components. BA 45B is heavily
connected to eye movement circuitry such as the frontal and sup-
plementary eye ﬁelds. While BA 45A also makes extensive frontal
connections, it is unique in having strong connections to supe-
rior temporal and auditory areas (Gerbella et al., 2010) and seems
more directly homologous to human BA 45. Human tractography,
using DTI and related methods, also reveals a clear parcellation of
Broca’s area (Anwander et al., 2007), with BA 44, BA 45, and the
deep frontal operculum having distinct patterns of connectivity.
There are two distinct exaptive hypotheses about the evolu-
tionary origins of language-speciﬁc functions in Broca’s region,
and particularly BA 45. The ﬁrst, which I will dub the “premotor
origins hypothesis,” continues a long line of suggestions that the
underlying computations of human language syntax are related in
some way to motor control and motor planning. Many theorists
have suggested that the hierarchical nature of linguistic structures
is related in some way to the hierarchical nature of motor plan-
ning (e.g., Lashley, 1951; Lieberman, 1984; Kimura, 1993; Allott,
1994; MacNeilage, 1998). This suggestion leads to a more concrete
suggestion in the current context: that the premotor functions
of BA 6 and the deep frontal operculum (with their agranular
layering pattern) provided the precursor of computations more
directly characteristic of language through a gradual “granulariza-
tion”of graymatter, and strengthening of pre-existing connections
to other regions of cortex (e.g., via the arcuate fasciculus to parietal
and temporal regions). Starting with BA 44, and progressing to BA
45, this would lead to a broader and more abstract computational
role for Broca’s area, culminating in the amodal, granular BA 45.
A second (and not mutually exclusive) hypothesis has not, to
my knowledge, been previously suggested. Apes and Old World
primates like chimpanzees and macaques have binocular vision
and trichromacy, reﬂecting an increased importance of the visual
modality relative to sound and olfaction. This is reﬂected speciﬁ-
cally in a heightened awareness of the gaze of others, and volitional
control of one’s own eyes, both of which play important roles
in Old World primate social behavior and understanding (Scaife
and Bruner, 1975; Emery et al., 1997; Emery, 2000). For review
of the importance of gaze and visual cueing in the evolution of
cognition and language see (Fitch et al., 2010). While the move-
ment of the eyes is clearly a motor function, its control requires
strong intracortical communication from visual and multi-modal
areas. When such visual dependency is combined with intense
social pressures, we might expect the computation of eye move-
ments to have a more abstract and generalized component than
limb or hand movements. Since, in the macaque, one portion of
BA 45 is closely linked to eye movements, while the other makes
long-distance cortical connections, I suggest that the abstract and
amodal computations involved in language (whether spoken or
signed) had a pre-adaptive foundation in the social and visu-
ally guided aspects of gaze that are, by hypothesis, subserved by
BA 45B.
These two hypotheses may in fact be complementary, in the
sense that the special role of BA 44 in language production and
processing may represent a kind of fusion of the two ﬂanking
regions, speciﬁcally the hierarchical premotor functions of BA 6,
and the multi-modal, integrative, and social functions of BA 45.
The result would be a more abstract computational process than
hierarchical motor planning: an operator that can combine or
unify pre-existing conceptual units (motor actions, vocalizations,
or visual objects) to freely create a discrete inﬁnity of modality-
independent cognitive structures. Such an operator shares the key
functionality required by modern theories of language, such as
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Merge inminimalist approaches (Chomsky, 1995;Hendrick, 2003;
Berwick and Chomsky, 2011) or “unify” in tree-adjoining, con-
struction grammar or other uniﬁcation grammars (cf. Hagoort,
2005b).Whether during comprehension or in production, such an
operator must quickly retrieve items from memory (e.g., retrieve
the phonological form of words from the lexicon), combine them
in a context–relevant fashion (e.g., using background informa-
tion and current context) into ﬂexible, temporary, goal-relevant
structures that can be parsed semantically (in comprehension)
or produced motorically via some serialization process (during
production). As emphasized by Hagoort, such an overarching
computation is consistent with both the neuroanatomy of Broca’s
area, as discussed above, and awide variety of brain imaging results
focused on language comprehension (Hagoort, 2005a,b).
Could hierarchy-building circuitry in BA 6 and the deep
frontal operculum, evolved in the context of motor planning
and dedicated to motor control, be exapted to produce a general
purpose, amodal, two-way circuit that can perform the com-
putational equivalent of Merge or Unify? While this hypothesis
clearly remains speculative at present, it has several points to
recommend it:
1. We know from the brain imaging studies cited above that
amodal, language circuitry exists in Broca’s region and is
involved in languageproduction, regardless of outputmodality;
2. Themodality-general portion of this circuitry appears to center
on BA 45;
3. We know from both lesion and brain imaging studies that
Broca’s area more generally (BA 44 included) is involved not
just in production by also in perception;
4. Studies of macaque mirror neurons and the human mirror
system provide a plausible foundation for the two-way nature
of this system, building on a pre-existing mirror system for
interpreting the actions of others;
5. We know that Broca’s area, broadly construed, can be activated
in non-linguistic tasks, consistent with a generalized, amodal
role of the LIFG in selection of appropriate action or items, and
suppression of irrelevant alternatives.
Not only is this exaptive hypothesis consistent with the data
above, but it makes several speciﬁc testable predictions about the
structure, connectivity, and function of BA 45:
1. BA 45 in humans should be more amodal than other compo-
nents of the LIFG, and in particular its white-matter connec-
tions should be longer, and fan out more widely, than those of
other regions;
2. Anatomically, the cytoarchitecture of BA 45 should be less
motor-driven, more perceptually embedded, and thus more
suited to amodal cognition than BA 6 or BA 44 (as already
suggested by its granular layer 4);
3. In monkeys, cells in BA 45A should ﬁre in a much wider variety
of situations than BA 44 or BA 6 (including in particular social
cognition tasks).
I conclude that exaptive hypotheses about the origins of syntax, far
from being “utterly implausible,” are consistent with a wide range
of neuroanatomical and functional data. I see such hypotheses,
when built upon a solid foundation of comparative neuroscien-
tiﬁc data, as presenting numerous testable predictions and avenues
for proﬁtable empirical investigation. Of course, “plausible” plus
“testable” does not equal “true.” But I hope to have convinced the
open-minded reader that there are good reasons for considering
exaptive hypotheses in research on the evolution of cognition, and
that the mistrust or outright hostility such hypotheses have evoked
from some quarters is unjustiﬁed.
TESTING EXAPTIVE HYPOTHESES: THE ROLE OF
COMPARATIVE RESEARCH
I will end with a brief attempt to clarify the role of comparative
research in testing evolutionary hypotheses in general, and exap-
tive hypotheses in particular. In brief, we can use comparison of
homologous traits in closely related species to derive inferences
about ancestral states. This is an important ﬁrst step in testing
any exaptive hypothesis: we must ﬁrst understand the ancestral
state that served as a putative “pre-adaptation.”When considering
the evolution of language, and neural components in particular,
the comparison set here will typically be non-human primates, or
sometimes mammals more generally.
The second set of comparisons involve “analogies” – similar
traits that have evolved independently, via convergent evolution
(such traits are one member of the broader class termed “homo-
plasies” by comparative biologists). Convergent evolution plays
a central role in testing evolutionary hypotheses, because each
example of a convergently evolved trait represents an indepen-
dent evolutionary event, and thus an independent data point for
statistical testing (Harvey and Pagel, 1991; Pagel, 1992). In con-
trast, a trait that is homologous among a group of species has, by
deﬁnition, evolved only once in that clade, and even if there are
hundreds of species sharing the trait, they constitute only a single
independent data point.
The clade used most frequently in comparative tests regard-
ing language evolution are birds, Class Aves, which have
evolved numerous traits convergently with some mammals (e.g.,
homeothermy or“warm bloodedness,”or large brains) and specif-
ically with humans (e.g., biparental care, vocal imitation, or
bipedalism).
HOMOLOGY: INFERENCES ABOUT ANCESTRAL STATE
A homologous trait is one that is shared among a group of related
organisms by virtue of its presence in their common ancestor.
When attempting to build a phylogeny, systematists distinguish
between two classes of homology. “Synapomorphies” are traits
that are shared in a particular clade, but lacking in other close rel-
atives, while “symplesiomorphies” are more broadly shared (due
to their present in a more ancient shared ancestor). Feathers are
a synapomorphy among living bird species (all birds have them,
and all living non-birds lack them), while the possession of a heart
or a mouth are symplesiomorphies (all birds have them, but so
do all other vertebrates). However, in the current context we are
concerned with rebuilding ancestral states, however far back they
might go, and so we will discuss homology in general.
Homology is a relative concept: it depends onwhat trait is being
examined, and what particular clade is being discussed. Thus, for
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example, the wings of birds and bats are homologous as forelimbs
(because they both derive from the forelimb of the shared tetra-
pod ancestor of birds and mammals) but are convergently evolved
analogs as wings. Furthermore, correct determination of homol-
ogy depends upon the level of mechanistic detail being discussed.
The complex, image-forming eyes found in insects, octopus, or
vertebrates evolved convergently (Allman, 1999) but their location
is nonetheless controlled by a homologous transcription factor
Pax-6 (Quiring et al., 1994; Gehring and Ikeo, 1999; van Heynin-
gen and Williamson, 2002). Such a situation has been termed deep
homology and appears to play a surprisingly important role in
human evolution (cf. Carroll, 2008; Fitch, 2009; Shubin et al.,
2009).
Careful examination of homologous traits in multiple species
allows us to reconstruct traits that were present in the common
ancestor of those species. For example, the corpus callosum is
found in all placental mammals (eutherians), but is absent in
marsupials and monotremes. This allows us to conclude that
the corpus callosum was not present in the common ancestor
of all mammals, but arose in the LCA of living eutherians. In
contrast, the anterior commissure is found in marsupials, and
more widely among vertebrates including birds, suggesting that
it evolved rather early in tetrapods. Such inferences about ances-
tral states depend on solid comparative neuroanatomy in living
organisms, and no fossil evidence is required to roughly date such
evolutionary events.
A broad comparative analysis is also important to determine
the directionality of any evolutionary changes in different lin-
eages. It is important to note that traits can be lost as well as
gained in evolution. There is no way to know, based on a simple
comparison of two species that differ in some trait, what the direc-
tionality of change might have been, and this requires outgroup
comparisons with other related species. For example, one might
think that the sexual swellings surrounding the vaginal area in
female chimpanzees are a primitive feature of primates, given that
such swellings are also seen in macaques and baboons. This would
lead to the conclusion that humans have lost such swellings in
our recent evolutionary history. An outgroup comparison, look-
ing at gorillas, orangutans, and gibbons (the other members of
our own ape clade) refutes that intuitive inference: none of these
apes shows sexual swellings. Thus in this case humans retain the
primitive state, and it is chimpanzees that have evolved a novelty
(convergently with moneys and baboons). This example illustrates
both the need for rigorous outgroup comparisons when analyz-
ing homology, and also illustrates that the LCA of humans and
chimpanzees was not a chimpanzee. In this case, and presumably
many others, chimpanzees have evolved, just as we have, in the last
6 million years.
CONVERGENCE: TESTING HYPOTHESES ABOUT MECHANISM AND
ADAPTIVE VALUE
Homologies play a crucial role in constructing phylogenies and
rebuilding extinct ancestors. For such problems, convergent evo-
lution is a nuisance and a distraction. But for a different set
of more abstract evolutionary problems, convergent evolution
provides one of the most powerful tools at our disposal, and
thus the second main arm of the comparative method. These
are problems involving statistically valid tests of evolutionary
hypotheses, whether of mechanism or evolutionary function.
In some cases convergent evolution of a similar trait can lead
us to new hypotheses about function. Consider the example of
the descended human larynx, which was until recently believed to
be uniquely human, and therefore assumed to be directly tied to
human speech abilities. The recent discoveries of a permanently
descended larynx in several deer species, big cats such as lions
and tigers, koalas,Mongolian gazelles, and goitered gazelles clearly
demonstrates that a descended larynx can serve some purpose
other than speech (Fitch, 2010). In this case, analyses strongly sug-
gest that the purpose is an exaggeration of the size conveyed by
vocalizations, so that animals with a descended larynx seem larger
to listeners. Because this explanation also applies to humans, it
offers a clear alternative to the standard idea that the descended
larynx is an exclusively speech-related trait. This is particularly
true since the human larynx descends a second time, at puberty,
but only in males. This sexually dimorphic descent seems unlikely
to be tied to speech abilities, since teenage males do not undergo
any improvement in these: instead it is simply part of a deeper,
richer, and more impressive voice timbre, quite similar to the red
deer’s roar.
In other cases convergent evolution of mechanism can cor-
roborate mechanistic hypotheses. A nice example is given by the
evolution of direct motor connections in birds. As discussed above
in hypothesis one, a plausible reason chimpanzees and other pri-
mates cannot talk, and humans can, is because humans possess
direct cortico-motor connections for laryngeal control, and other
primates do not. This is a correlational argument: humans have
speech and have direct connections, and other primates do not.
Therefore, direct connections are involved in speech motor con-
trol. While plausible, such arguments are never particularly con-
vincing.However, in this case, data frombirds strongly support the
argument, because direct connections from the avian equivalent of
motor cortex (area RA) indeed have direct monosynaptic connec-
tions onto the motor neurons controlling the muscles of the syrinx
(the birds primary organ of voice). These connections are lacking
in bird species incapable of vocal learning (Wild, 1993a,b). This
case, where an analogous mechanism is present in species which
have convergently evolved the analogous ability, lends great cre-
dence to the Kuypers/Jürgens hypothesis. What is more, there are
many other relevant species inwhich to test this prediction, includ-
ing all themammalswhohave convergently evolved vocal learning.
Many other examples of the power of convergent evolution
could be drawn from the genetic level, already explored in previ-
ous work. For example, the role of FOXP2 in vocal control and
vocal motor learning has been elegantly explored in birds by Con-
stance Scharff and colleagues (Haesler et al., 2004, 2007; Scharff
and Haesler, 2005), and provides the ﬁrst example of deep homol-
ogy yet known in the domain of vocal motor control (cf. Fitch,
2009; Scharff and Petri, 2011). Research on axon guidance has
examined the development of a set of connections in the avian
brain that may be the analogy of the arcuate fasciculus, and sug-
gests that a set of broadly shared axonal guidance molecules, the
cadherins, may play a key role in this (Matsunaga and Okanoya,
2008, 2009). An intriguing possibility is that these same molecules,
or close relatives, might also play a role in the development of
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intracortical connections that underlie syntax or spoken language
more broadly.
In summary then, both analogy and homology will always have
a role to play in the comparative method, and the importance of
convergent evolution for testing evolutionary hypotheses means
that research on the avian brain will continue to be extremely
important in analyses of traits that make humans unique among
primates.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have shown that models of neural/cognitive evolu-
tion that invoke exaptation – changes in function – are fully con-
sistent with Darwin’s ideas about evolution by natural selection, as
well as with modern evolutionary biology and contemporary neu-
roscience. To illustrate this point I have assembled three exaptive
hypotheses, focused on different mechanisms of human spoken
language, to try to illustrate this approach from a “nuts and bolts”
perspective, and to make some speciﬁc predictions that could be
tested. Although I ﬁnd each of these hypotheses plausible, I have
no personal investment in them being true in any ultimate sense.
But I do believe that they have a virtue that all good scientiﬁc
hypotheses share: they are testable. Speciﬁc, testable hypotheses
remain all too rare in research on the evolution of language. Fur-
thermore, such hypotheses present numerous avenues for testing
and elaboration using the comparativemethod,both for pinpoint-
ing ancestral states via homology, and for testing hypotheses using
convergence.
Since testing plausible hypotheses is the surest route to progress
I know of in science, I would be very pleased to see any of the
three hypotheses above tested, even if refuted in the process. If
that occurs, a new and better hypothesis will surely rise to take its
place.
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